The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information S Barbieri, DA Malueg, I Topolyan Economic Theory 57, 603-640, 2014 | 54 | 2014 |
Private provision of a discrete public good: Efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game S Barbieri, DA Malueg Economic Theory 37, 51-80, 2008 | 42 | 2008 |
Threshold uncertainty in the private-information subscription game S Barbieri, DA Malueg Journal of Public Economics 94 (11-12), 848-861, 2010 | 32 | 2010 |
Private provision of a discrete public good: Continuous‐strategy equilibria in the private‐information subscription game S Barbieri, DA Malueg Journal of Public Economic Theory 10 (4), 529-545, 2008 | 30 | 2008 |
Private-information group contests: best-shot competition S Barbieri, DA Malueg Games and Economic Behavior 98, 219-234, 2016 | 27 | 2016 |
Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests S Barbieri, M Serena Games and Economic Behavior 145, 526-556, 2024 | 21 | 2024 |
Communication and early contributions S Barbieri Journal of Public Economic Theory 14 (3), 391-421, 2012 | 18 | 2012 |
Group efforts when performance is determined by the “best shot” S Barbieri, DA Malueg Economic Theory 56, 333-373, 2014 | 17 | 2014 |
Private information in the BBV model of public goods S Barbieri, DA Malueg Journal of Public Economic Theory 18 (6), 857-881, 2016 | 15 | 2016 |
Increasing fundraising success by decreasing donor choice S Barbieri, DA Malueg Journal of Public Economic Theory 16 (3), 372-400, 2014 | 15 | 2014 |
Profit-maximizing sale of a discrete public good via the subscription game in private-information environments S Barbieri, DA Malueg The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 10 (1), 0000102202193517041575, 2010 | 14 | 2010 |
Membership in citizen groups S Barbieri, A Mattozzi Games and Economic Behavior 67 (1), 217-232, 2009 | 14* | 2009 |
On the voluntary provision of “weakest‐link” public goods: The case of private information S Barbieri, DA Malueg Journal of Public Economic Theory 21 (5), 866-894, 2019 | 13 | 2019 |
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players S Barbieri, M Serena Games and Economic Behavior 136, 1-30, 2022 | 12 | 2022 |
Group contests with private information and the “weakest link” S Barbieri, D Kovenock, DA Malueg, I Topolyan Games and Economic Behavior 118, 382-411, 2019 | 11 | 2019 |
Biasing unbiased dynamic contests S Barbieri, M Serena SSRN, 2018 | 9 | 2018 |
Middle-class flight from post-Katrina New Orleans: A theoretical analysis of inequality and schooling S Barbieri, JHY Edwards Regional Science and Urban Economics 64, 12-29, 2017 | 8 | 2017 |
Private‐information group contests with complementarities S Barbieri, I Topolyan Journal of Public Economic Theory 23 (5), 772-800, 2021 | 6 | 2021 |
Private-information group contests S Barbieri, DA Malueg Available at SSRN 2501771, 2015 | 5 | 2015 |
Complementarity and information in collective action S Barbieri Economic Theory 75 (1), 167-206, 2023 | 4 | 2023 |