| Costly concessions: An empirical framework for matching with imperfectly transferable utility A Galichon, SD Kominers, S Weber Journal of Political Economy 127 (6), 2875-2925, 2019 | 116 | 2019 |
| The role of evolving marital preferences in growing income inequality E Ciscato, S Weber Journal of Population Economics 33 (1), 307-347, 2020 | 53 | 2020 |
| Marriage market counterfactuals using matching models A Dupuy, S Weber Economica 89 (353), 29-43, 2022 | 23* | 2022 |
| The effect of meeting rates on matching outcomes S Jaffe, S Weber Economic Theory 67 (2), 363-378, 2019 | 11 | 2019 |
| Matching function equilibria with partial assignment: existence, uniqueness and estimation L Chen, ESY Choo, A Galichon, S Weber Uniqueness and Estimation (May 13, 2019), 2019 | 8 | 2019 |
| The nonlinear Bernstein-Schrödinger equation in economics A Galichon, SD Kominers, S Weber International Conference on Geometric Science of Information, 51-59, 2015 | 8 | 2015 |
| Collective Models and the Marriage Market S Weber working paper, 2022 | 7 | 2022 |
| Reconsidering the Choice Between Gasoline-and Diesel-Powered Cars: Modeling Demand and Automakers' Reactions V Breteau, S Weber Transportation research record 2375 (1), 18-28, 2013 | 3 | 2013 |
| The empirical content of marital surplus in matching models K Doorley, A Dupuy, S Weber Economics Letters 176, 51-54, 2019 | | 2019 |
| Family, marriage markets and inequality: a matching approach S Weber Sciences Po publications, 2017 | | 2017 |
| Famille, marché du mariage et inégalités: l’approche par les modeles d’appariement S Weber Sciences Po Paris, 2017 | | 2017 |
| Integrating Collective Codels and the Marriage Market: An Illustration S Weber Available at SSRN 2804701, 2016 | | 2016 |
Alfred GalichonNew York UniversityVerified email at nyu.edu
